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This paper presents an application of the Composite Index of Market Access (CIMA) to illustrate its application for evaluating market access for Brazilian broiler meat exports in relevant importing markets such as the European Union (EU-27), Saudi Arabia, Russia and Japan. The research reported is being prepared as a pilot study commissioned by the ICTSD as part of a work program for developing a "composite index of protection" which accounts not only for tariffs, but also for other protectionist measures that are assuming an increasing importance in determining market access for tropical goods such as non-tariff trade barriers and the impact of domestic subsidies.
The basic ideas and methodological procedure for the calculation of the CIMA were developed by Professor Timothy Josling and presented at an ICTSD Concept note (ICTSD, 2009) , where he explains that the main purpose of this index is to emphasize that the issues of major concern within the working initiative could all be encompassed in the term "market access".
The study yields estimates based on data collected from primary and secondary sources about the main costs faced by broiler meat exporters when they sell into import markets. A three year period (2006) (2007) (2008) was selected for the analysis.
As part of a work programme that resulted from a dialogue organized with the Institute for International Trade Negotiations in Salvador de Bahia, Brazil, ICTSD commissioned a methodology paper by Prof. Timothy Josling as well as pilot country studies by other experts. The methodology and country studies have been reviewed by government officials, academics, and civil society at two meetings Washington DC. An Advisory Panel has helped refine the CIMA methodology and recommended a list of products and markets to study as part of a set of pilot studies. This study is the first in the series of pilot studies.
The World Bank and IMF have developed a number of indices aimed at measuring trade restrictiveness, as a result of work they conducted to understand the impact of structural adjustment programmes on recipient countries' policies. Additionally, the OECD's Producer Support Estimate (PSE) provides a methodologically consistent means of comparing the level of domestic support on agriculture amongst its members. These tools, though useful for their intended purpose, fail to address the needs of developing country exporters trying to assess the costs they face in entering a given market. CIMA is intended to provide a clear and concise tool for this purpose.
The CIMA project is not intended to provide a comparison of the barriers faced by different tropical products. Rather, the project is meant to illustrate the actual costs faced by exporters of selected tropical products when trying to penetrate markets. While liberalisation through tariff reduction may partially achieve the aim of facilitating access for tropical products, the CIMA project highlights the fact that tariff reductions are only a part of the puzzle that trade policy has to solve.
The findings of the CIMA project can be used in many ways, including ensuring a more rational management of actual barriers to access, and hence, enhancing developing country opportunities to trade. It can also be useful in negotiations for further liberalization. Using the CIMA approach would help shift the focus from the number and complexity of support measures, as well as standards, to a uniform and comparable index so that negotiators may conclude more transparent and equitable trade agreements in the future. We hope this study, and the CIMA initiative, is of import to the reader and of help to the policy-maker.
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This study applied the Composite Index of Market Access (CIMA) methodology to compare markets in terms of their relative openness to Brazilian broiler meat exports and also to evaluate changes in market access along a period from 2006 to 2008. The importing markets selected for the analysis included: EU-27; Japan; Russia and Saudi Arabia, which are the greatest importers in the world market at the period selected for the analysis. Three of these, except for Russia, were also recognized as major importers of Brazilian broiler meat.
The CIMA values calculated in this analysis seem consistent with expectations which may be interpreted as an advantage of the method. The EU-27 and Russia presented lower CIMA values, indicating less accessible markets to Brazilian broiler exports compared to Japan and Saudi Arabia. The lowest CIMA value (63 percent) for the whole period was calculated for Russia suggesting that that the market of this country has been less open to Brazilian broiler meta than all other three markets. The CIMA values obtained for the EU bloc presented a considerable variation and also the lowest value in 2008, of 66 percent, which might be explained by the tariff reconsolidation that is being introduced to deal with increased imports of salted and processed broiler meat. In fact, the EU-27 market presents the highest level of protection with a relatively diversified set of trade protection instruments including import tariff; tariff quota and safeguards.
Japan and Saudi Arabia use only import tariffs to restrict market access to Brazilian broilers, although applying relatively lower rates than those used by the European Union to protect their domestsic market.
Sanitary and technical requirements have not been identified as important trade restricting instruments for Brazilian exports through the period of the analysis. On the contrary, quality and sanitary aspects of Brazilian poultry seem to promote its participation in relevant importing markets such as Russia, when other countries are not able to comply with the requirements. In fact, with the ban of US poultry exports by Russian authorities in January 2010 due to sanitary issues, Brazilian exports became an alternative in case US supplies fails to comply with the Russian food safety regulations established for poultry meat (restricting the use of chlorine in poultry plants to 0.5 parts per million).
It has also been verified that market access can be different according to the type of the broiler meat export. Chicken cuts is much more protected in the EU-27 (CIMA equal to 60 percent in 2006), for example, than processed meat (CIMA is 90 percent in 2006 and 2007). The same has been observed for Russia. Thus, in EU-27 and Russia the meat categories with highest import volumes are those with the lowest market access composite indicator value, suggesting higher protection. This seems to be indicating that this meat category (chicken cut) is preferred by European and Russian consumers such that a relatively high import quantity has occurred despite of the relatively low market access. Market access investigations have indicated that costs faced by exporters can considerably exceed a simple tariff when seeking entry to a market or expanding its share in the world market (Krissoff, Calvin and Gray, 1997; Duval, 2006) . Still, there are few tools available that provide consistent measures of the changes in market access considering a wide spectrum of protectionist instruments (Josling, 2009 follow are the EU-27, Japan and Saudi Arabia. These were included in the evaluation of the relative market access or barriers presented for Brazilian exports in this analysis (Table 3) . The selection of countries for the analysis was based in two major aspects: (i) the country's relative importance as importers in the global market; and (ii) the relevance as importer of Brazilian broiler meat.
Production

Major Broiler Meat Exporters
Brazilian broiler meat has reached a considerable number of importing markets as its exports have been shipped to more than 50 countries between 2007 and 2008. Despite its positive performance, it presents a highly concentrated participation in a few markets. The EU-27, Japan, China and Saudi Arabia, are responsible for 48.6 percent of total Brazilian exports (Table 4) . These importing markets are also among the 10 major buyers in the global market, represented in Table 3 .
Russia has also been included in the investigation due to its importance in the international market (Table 3) , although it has not been a major importer of Brazilian products (Table 4) . Figure 6 ).
Importers of Brazilian broiler meat
Source: COMTRADE-UN (2010).
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BARRIERS TO BRAZILIAN BROILER EXPORTS
This section presents a discussion of the major market access issues related to Brazilian exports of broiler meat into important export markets.
The EU is not only the largest importer (the bloc was responsible for 14.6 percent of total Brazilian broiler exports in 2008), but is also known for imposing the highest trade barriers upon Brazilian broiler meat exports. Moreover, Brazil provides 80 percent of EU broiler imports from non-EU countries (ABEF; 2009).
EU -Tariff and tariff quota
The EU bloc has used specific applied and ad valorem tariffs, besides tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) and Special Safeguards (SSG) to restrict Brazilian broiler meat imports as represented in Table 6 .
The evaluation of tariff and tariff quota is based on tariff lines disaggregated by eight digit Harmonized System (HS-8) levels (as described in the first column of the There are four EU-27 quotas consolidated in the Uruguay Round for chicken meat which have be identified as: (i) quota 062: for chicken carcasses, fresh, chilled or frozen equivalent to 6,200 tons; (ii) quota 063: chicken cuts fresh, chilled or frozen with a volume of 4,000 tons; (iii) quota 064: cuts of fowls of the species Gallus domestics, frozen; -boneless breasts and cuts thereof; other: 15,500 tons, of which 7,500 t is for Brazil, and (iv) quota 065: boneless cuts of fowls of the species Gallus domestics, frozen: 700 tons. Considering that a quota volume is a minimum limit notified to the WTO, it can be increased, although cannot be reduced. As shown in An important characteristic to be observed while evaluating the tariff quotas is the administration method adopted. For broilers, the EU provides a license upon demand which allows importers to acquire certain volumes within a quota but restricts the ability of exporters to negotiate prices. The EU legislation authorizes the transfer of import licenses among importers (underwrite). That transfer, however, can be interpreted as an imperfection of the EU quota system since it allows the price paid by importers to buy licenses to be incorporated by the import price, therefore punishing exporters. As a result, the quota rent is appropriated by the importer.
European Union
Still, the quota rent exists only when imports are inside the quota established by the importing country. In 2007 and 2008 imports for the tariff lines 02071290 were 14,896 tons and 11,556 tons, respectively, and for the tariff line 02071410 it has been of 92,487 tons and 103,487 tons, respectively (WTO, 2010). As can be observed in Table 6 the quota volumes were lower than imports in both cases. Therefore, for all volumes imported by quota the importer receives the quota rent.
EU -Safeguards
Another interesting characteristic of European imports is that the bloc has reserved the right to impose a price based special safeguard (SSG trigger price) for chicken imports, which represents an additional tariff over the applied tariff. Therefore, with the application of the SSG the effective tariff becomes higher than the tariff consolidated at the WTO.
The special safeguards applied by the European Union can be calculated as the value equivalent to the application of the safeguard through the years of the analysis (2006) (2007) (2008) It is important to note, however, that this resource was not related to the general quota established for the country chosen to substitute imports subject to restrictions due to sanitary problems. Japan and Saudi Arabia have been using import tariffs to restrict market access to Brazilian broiler exports, however at relatively lower rates than those used by other relevant importing markets such as the European Union bloc.
Russia
Given that the only border protection used by Japan is the tariff, the CIMA was calculated based only on this protectionist instrument. Tariff rates imposed by that country for fresh and processed broiler meat from Brazil of 11.9 and 6 percent, respectively. Japan has not established tariff quota or applied SSG for broiler meat imported from Brazil during the period of the analysis (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) 
Japan and Saudi Arabia
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to calculate CIMAs it was necessary to to transform the products into an equivalent unit of measure since broiler meat is imported under different tariff lines that represent products in different forms (whole, cuts, processed and salted). For that purpose, after measuring the value of the protection for each product, these were subject to equivalence coefficients to obtain a homogeneous reference. The coefficients used in this analysis considered 1.0 for whole; 1.4 for broiler cuts; 1.45 for salted meat, in brine; and processed meat transformation coefficient that can vary from 0.8 to 0.35 for processed broiler.
The private sector, mainly Brazilian Association of Poultry Exports (ABEF) was the primary source for information regarding problems associated with market access to relevant importing markets in the global scenario. Other relevant data sources have been WITS/ Comtrade for trade flows, WTO for tariffs and tariff quotas for Members, complemented by official public data on third market regulations, barriers and distortions, Russian tariffs and tariff quotas, SSG for European imports, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for exchange rates.
The calculation of the Composite Index of Market Access (CIMA) for this case study was delineated to identify the percentage of the importer price that is not subject to importer barriers. Therefore, the full range of costs and protection faced by the Brazilian broiler meat exports when selling in each relevant importing market was included in the calculation, together with the price paid by importers.
According to the guidelines, a the CIMA calculation must include duties and taxes paid to the importing country government (particularly border measures such as tariffs and tariff quotas besides excise duties on domestic markets) as well as expenses to comply with health and safety standards required in the market of destiny. In addition, subsidies provided to production and export of the good concerned should also be incorporated to provide a reliable estimate of relative market access for relevant competing suppliers (including domestic producers in the importing country whenever appropriate). CIMA represents the relative market access as a measure of how much is actually received by each exporter after discounting the import barriers from the price paid by importers.
A representation of the CIMA suggested by Josling (2009) can be obtained from a basic calculation of the barriers to market access (BMA), as indicated in equation (1):
Where: EDT is the excise duty paid on sales in importing country; OMC is the other marketing costs including shipping and handling; PLC represents private label costs that are incurred in meeting the standards demanded by the private sector; PLP is the price premium that is received by the exporter for fulfilling the private standards where these are over and above the publicly required SPS/TBT standards; SPC is the costs associated with meeting SPS and TBT requirements; MTD stands for tariffs and other duties paid on importation and; SUB is any subsidies paid by the importing country to producers.
Considering that PRM is the price exporters receive by unit of the product as it enters the importing market (excluding subsidies), the BMA can be expressed as a proportion of total returns, such as:
Or can be expressed in percentage terms as:
Definition of Measurement Unit
Calculation of the CIMA
Based on the BMA, the CIMA provides indication of costs with market access incurred by each exporter by the extent it falls short of 100:
For the present study, considering the characteristics of the importing markets selected for the analysis, the price considered as a coherent account as a basis for calculating the BMA was represented as:
Which expresses the price at which the product is sold in the importing country as the sum of the CIF unit value (which, in turn, is equivalent the sum of the export price (PRX) plus transport and other marketing costs (OMC)) to the unit cost of protectionist barriers (SPC +MTD).
Some terms have been omitted from the base price equation suggested by Josling (2009) given the characteristics of the markets selected for the analysis. Excise duties, for example, were not a concern in Brazilian broiler meat exports to its major importing markets, therefore was not considered. Subsidies to exports (SUB), price premium (PRP) and label costs (PLC) were also not identified as important factors to compose a price ladder. Therefore, it seemed more coherent to express the price starting from the unit value of imports in each market (PRM). In this form, cost of production (COP) and exporter profits (PRF) were not relevant for the calculation of the CIMA.
The barriers to market access identified as important for this study were: tariffs (specific and/or ad valorem); tariff quotas (including tariffs in and out quota, as well as the quota volume); and safeguards. Of all these factors, only specific tariffs values are promptly available. The ad valorem equivalent of tariffs was transformed in specific values by multiplying the import price (CIF) by the ad valorem percentage.
When the country presents a tariff quota, the equivalent value calculation depends on the efficiency of the quota that was effective for each period or year of the analysis. When the country imports were lower than the quota volume, then the import is subject to an in-quota rate, which is equivalent to the tariff specified as a protectionist measure to imports. In the case that imports are higher than the quota volume, the access to the market is subject to an extra or out-quota. Still, when imports are equal to the volume established for the tariff quota, the protection must be varying between the in and the out-quota tariff. When this is the case, the domestic price of the product must be used to estimate the effective degree of protection represented by the volume restriction.
After calculating the CIMA for each type of meat, as classified at HS-8 level, these were consolidated into an annual CIMA for each country by calculating a weighted average. The weighted average considered the volume of imports and the equivalence coefficient between the different meat types. The CIMA values obtained for the EU bloc presented a considerable variation through the period and the lowest value in 2008, of 66, which might be explained by the tariff reconsolidation that was implemented to deal with increased imports of salted and processed broiler meat.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results reported in Table 9 were obtained considering a weighted average, by type of broiler meat imported by each country. It should be observed, however, in the results reported at Tables 10 to 13 in the Appendix, that the level of protection upon imports varies according to the type of meat disaggregated by tariff line at an HS-8 level.
For the European Union, the level of market access indicated by the CIMA value for salted and processed broiler meat seems higher than for fresh meat. In addition, it can be verified that the level of market access for whole broilers is higher than for cuts in this same market (Table 10 ). This could be somehow unexpected, considering that consumers' preferences and market prices are higher for cuts of broiler. However, the evaluation suggests that the markets for cuts with higher preference by consumers and also higher prices are more protected, being subject to higher tariffs (in absolute and relative terms). Despite of the protection, an evaluation of the EU import volumes shows clearly that it has increased more for cuts through the years of the analysis.
The importance of the special safeguard (SSG) mechanism for shaping EU-27 imports from Brazil must also be stressed. About 20 percent of the European market protection of broiler meat cuts is due to the application of an additional tariff through the SSG mechanism (Table 10) . In this context, however, the more competitive exporters are more penalized since the SSG mechanism establishes higher additional tariffs for lower import prices. As can be observed, the tariff in 2006 was higher than in the following years. Since price reached higher values in 2007, the SSG was triggered, but in a lower value (Table 10 ).
An evaluation of the Russian market in Table  11 shows that, similar to what is observed for 14 ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development the EU (Table 10) , the meat categories with highest imported quantities are those with the lowest market access composite indicator value (Table 11) . Therefore, the highest CIMA is associated to processed meat which represents only a marginal participation in volume as shown in Figure 5 .
The Saudi Arabian broiler meat imports for the HS 02071200, that concentrates most of the countries' imports from Brazil, present a CIMA value relatively high in 2007 (95). A low BMA (and therefore high CIMA) was observed particularly for processed meat, which is also the type of broiler meat imported in lowest volumes (Table 12 ). Although appropriate to express the result of trade policy actually applied, the CIMA cannot be used to predict policy changes. As observed in the EU-27 context, if import prices were higher than those observed through the years taken for the analysis, a reduction in import barriers could be associated to higher CIMA values.
It has also been observed that there were relatively low exported volumes associated with high CIMA values and relatively high exported volumes linked to low CIMA values, particularly regarding Brazilian exports to the EU market. This seems to be indicating that it was possible to identify this despite the seemingly high level of exports of broiler meat, in aggregate terms into relevant markets such as the EU, the Brazilian exports of specific types of broiler meat, such as broiler cuts which are preferred and assume a higher price in the importing market have clearly been subject to a relatively low market access.
The method has presented some limitations regarding the proposal introduced by Josling 
